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GULF FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN v. FEDERAL HOME
LOAN BANK BOARD: A NEW JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD
THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS?
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades federal regulation of financial
institutions has been one of the most striking examples of adminis-
trative capacity for complex and exhaustive supervision of a pri-
vate industry. Congress' broad grants of discretionary power to the
banking agencies, combined with judicial reluctance to interfere in
the system, have provided the banking agencies with almost unlim-
ited discretion in the promulgation and enforcement of regulations.
Although the courts have been criticized for virtually rubber-
stamping the agencies' decisions,' recognition of four factors has
lent respectability to the tradition of very limited review of agency
action: (1) maintenance of a sound and viable banking system is of
inestimable importance to the government and the public at large;
(2) Congress cannot feasibly provide for all possible threats to
sound and ethical banking in a statute; (3) the federal banking
agencies have experience and expertise in what has become a high-
ly technical field; and (4) it is clearly desirable that the banking
laws be applied with as much uniformity as possible.2
In a recent decision, however, the Fifth Circuit moved to cur-
tail the wide discretion traditionally granted the banking agencies.
In Gulf Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Board,3 the court overturned a cease and desist order
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board which required the
petitioning savings and loan to cease calculating interest in viola-
tion of its loan contracts and to reimburse borrowers for excess in-
terest charges resulting from the erroneous calculations. The deci-
1. See Greenfield & Metzger, Agency Discretion to Deny Bank Mergers: What Are the
Limits, BANKING L.J. Oct. 1981, at 838, 839, 845-6. Cf., Note, City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 65 CORN. L. REv. 449 (1980) (endorsing court's rigorous inquiry into FHLBB deci-
sion as improvement on historically inadequate judicial review).
2. See generally infra notes 46-57 & 76-85 and accompanying text.
3. 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998.27 (U.S. July 2, 1982)
(No. 81-1744).
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sion, which rejected both the Bank Board's exercise and
interpretation of its cease and desist authority, has drawn the pro-
test of all the federal banking agencies.
In the wake of current legislative efforts to deregulate financial
institutions, the implications of the Gulf Federal decision may
reach beyond the immediate limitation of the Bank Board's discre-
tion. Recognition in the banking industry of the deference paid to
the banking agencies by the courts has in the past allowed the reg-
ulatory agencies to discourage unsound and unethical practices
quickly and informally without litigation. By substituting its dis-
cretion for that of the Bank Board, the Gulf Federal court has is-
sued an invitation for frequent court challenges to agency supervi-
sion and may have destroyed the informal, non-coercive
relationship that federal banking agencies have enjoyed with their
charges. Thus, while several congressmen and the banking agencies
struggle to produce a formula to revitalize the banking industry,
and especially the troubled savings and loan system, the Gulf Fed-
eral court may have signaled the industry to facilitate its own de-
regulation by testing the legitimacy of previously unconsidered
practices in the courts.4
This Comment will explore the traditionally wide discretion
given the banking agencies, the sound reasons supporting the
traditional attitude, and the areas in which the Gulf Federal deci-
sion departs from this reasoning. The first section will present the
facts and reasoning of Gulf Federal. The second section will dis-
cuss the cease and desist authority of the federal banking agencies
and the exceptionally broad discretion that has been given these
agencies in defining "unsafe and unsound practices," the criteria
4. Although this Comment is critical of the Gulf Federal court, it should be noted that
the Bank Board failed to brief the court on recent caselaw from within the Fifth Circuit
supporting its position. While there were several relevant decisions handed down by the
Fifth Circuit in the five years preceding Gulf Federal, see infra notes 52 & 84 and accompa-
nying text, the Bank Board's briefs mention only one of these recent cases, without provid-
ing discussion. See Brief in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order, In re Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jefferson Parish, Fed. Home
Loan Bank Bd. Resolution No. 77-171, Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d
259 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief]; Supplemental Brief in Reply
for Respondent Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651
F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental Brief]. On its petition for re-
hearing en banc, however, the FHLBB presented Fifth Circuit caselaw in much greater de-
tail. See Petition for Rehearing en banc, Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d
259 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Rehearing].
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for exercise of the cease and desist authority.5 The third section
will discuss the appropriate standards of review of agency action in
general and of banking agency action in particular. The final sec-
tion will discuss possible implications of the Gulf Federal decision.
I. GULF FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN V. FEDERAL HomE LOAN
BANK BOARD
A. Regulatory Context of Gulf Federal
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was created by Congress
in 1932 to provide a reliable source of long term credit for home-
owners, primarily in response to the financial crisis of the late
1920s and the 1930s.6 The current regulatory structure of the
Board was created in 1933 with the enactment of the Home Own-
er's Loan Act (HOLA).7 The HOLA authorized the Board to issue
rules and regulations for "the organization, incorporation, exami-
nation, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as
'Federal Savings and Loan Associations' . . . and to issue charters
therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of local
mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United
States."8 The express purpose of the Act was "to provide local mu-
tual thrift institutions in which people may invest their funds and
S.. to provide for the financing of homes." All federal savings
and loans are required by the HOLA to become members of a Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank.10 Following enactment of the HOLA, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was created by
the National Housing Act to provide insurance for federal savings
and loans and other qualified institutions similar to that provided
for commercial banks by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC).""
Prior to 1966 the Bank Board's only enforcement mechanisms
were its powers to terminate an association's insurance or to ap-
point a receiver. 2 Congress added the Board's authority to issue
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
6. See 75 CONG. REc. 12,606, 12,627, 12,721, 14,452, 14,590, 14,593 (1932).
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (1976).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
9. Id.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(0 (1976).
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725-30 (1976).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i) (1976); See also S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6,
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cease and desist orders to the HOLA in 1966 to provide a flexible,
intermediate sanction.1 3 The Board's cease and desist authority al-
lows it to issue a cease and desist order following notice of charges
and a hearing upon the charges, where it is determined at the hear-
ing (1) that a savings and loan association is violating, has violated
or is about to violate a law, rule, regulation, or other condition im-
posed in writing by the Board, or (2) that the association is engag-
ing, has engaged, or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound
practice.14 The order may require the association to refrain from
the violation or practice and require affirmative action to correct
conditions resulting from the violation or practice.15 A savings and
loan association with respect to which a cease and desist order is
issued is entitled to petition for review of the order in a federal
court of appeals.'
B. Gulf Federal
The petitioning savings and loan association in Gulf Federal
sought review of a Bank Board order requiring it to cease and de-
sist from calculating interest in a manner contrary to the terms of
its mortgage agreements and to reimburse borrowers for overpay-
ments of interest resulting from the erroneous calculations.1 7 In
June of 1969, pursuant to a resolution by its Board of Directors,
Gulf Federal Savings and Loan Association replaced provisions in
its mortgage agreements calling for interest to be calculated ac-
cording to 360 day interest tables with provisions calling for calcu-
lation according to 365 day tables. The 365 day tables were never
used in practice and the Board of Directors reversed itself and re-
instated use of 360 day tables in October, but Gulf Federal inad-
vertently continued to use loan agreements providing for use of
365 day tables until February 1973. As a result, interest on 444
loans was calculated according to an interest schedule different
from that expressly contained in the loan contracts and 444 bor-
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3532, 3536-38 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 1482].
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also S. REP. No. 1482, supra
note 12, at 3537-38.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
15. Id.
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(D) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
17. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259,261-62 (5th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 31
GULF FEDERAL
rowers were charged an additional five days interest per year.18
In March of 1977, the Bank Board issued a Notice of Charges
and Hearing against Gulf Federal. The notice alleged that the as-
sociation was breaching the interest calculation provisions of 444
loan contracts, and that the breaches constituted an unsafe and
unsound practice within the meaning of the HOLA and were viola-
tions of federal common law and the "sound and economical home
financing" provisions of the Bank Act.19 Gulf Federal's answer ad-
mitted to charging interest in violation of the contractual provi-
sions in question, but denied that the violation was a breach of
contract or an unsafe or unsound practice. The association also af-
firmatively asserted that the Bank Board lacked authority to bring
the cease and desist action.20 Following an administrative hearing,
however, an administrative law judge recommended that the Bank
Board issue a cease and desist order requiring Gulf Federal to re-
frain from calculating interest in violation of its contracts and to
repay overcharged interest to the 444 borrowers issued "365 day"
contracts.2 The full Board issued the order and based its authority
on its determination that, as alleged in the Notice of Charges, Gulf
Federal was breaching its loan contracts and this breach consti-
tuted an "unsafe or unsound practice" and was a violation of fed-
eral common law and the Bank Act.22
Gulf Federal petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for
review of the order, claiming, inter alia, that the Bank Board had
exceeded its cease and desist authority in an attempt to engage in
consumer protection. The Board's function, it argued, is to protect
18. Id. at 261-62; Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-6.
19. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 4, at 2-3. 12 U.S.C. § 1424 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), provides that no institution may become a member of a Federal Home Loan Bank if,
in the judgment of the Bank Board, "its home financing policy is inconsistent with sound
and economical home financing." In addition, 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
states:
[T]he Board may, after hearing, remove any member from membership...
if, in the opinion of the Board, such member . . . (iii) has a management or
home financing policy inconsistent with sound and economical home financing.
20. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 4, at 3. Gulf Federal argued that the term "un-
safe and unsound practices" referred solely to practices which threaten the financial stabil-
ity of the institution. Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 10. The Bank apparently based
its claim that it was not breaching the loan contracts on the fact that its continued use of
the 365 day contracts was a mistake. Id. at 6.
21. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 4, at 3.
22. Id. at 3-4.
1982]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the financial stability of savings and loan associations, not to pro-
tect consumers.2 3 In particular, Gulf Federal urged that the phrase
"unsafe and unsound practices" referred only to "those practices
that threaten the financial stability of insured institutions" and as-
serted that the Bank Board's order, not the disputed contracts,
threatened its financial stability
2 4
The Bank Board responded that the order was a proper exer-
cise of its statutory authority, maintaining that its regulatory re-
sponsibility extended to all aspects of federal savings and loans'
operations.2 The Board denied that its cease and desist authority
based on the "unsafe and unsound" provision was limited to eradi-
cating practices which jeopardized financial stability, but neverthe-
less argued that Gulf Federal's overcharge practice "created an ab-
normal risk of loss or damage" to the association and was
"contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent lending. '26
The overcharge practice, the Board argued, created potential lia-
bility on Gulf Federal's part for the overcharged interest and puni-
tive damages, and jeopardized the integrity and community stand-
ing of the association and other savings and loan associations in
the area.1
7
Upon review of the order, the Gulf Federal court reversed the
Board's decision, holding that there was no statutory authority for
the order. In support of its decision the court referred to the legis-
lative history of the Bank Board's cease and desist authority and
noted the fears expressed by several members of Congress during
debate that the statute, and the "unsafe and unsound" practice
formula in particular, was too vague and delegated unlimited au-
thority to the banking agencies. Citing reassurances from support-
ers of the bill in response to these fears, the court concluded that it
was the intent of Congress that the "unsafe and unsound" practice
formula be restricted to practices which "threaten the financial in-
tegrity of the association."2 8 The argument that authority to inter-
23. Gulf Federal, 651 F.2d at 263.
24. Id. at 261-62; Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 10, 35.
25. Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 10.
26. 651 F.2d at 262.
27. Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 7, 15.
28. 651 F.2d at 264. In particular, the court notes the following statement by Congress-
man Patman, the sponsor of the bill:
[O]f course, it should be clear to all that the cease-and-desist powers and man-
agement removal powers are aimed specifically at actions impairing the safety or
[Vol. 31
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vene was present in the instant case due to the risk of potential
liability was rejected on the ground that liability would become im-
mediate were the Bank Board's order upheld. The loss of public
confidence rationale for Bank Board intervention was rejected be-
cause the court feared it would result in open-ended supervision of
savings and loans.29 The court concluded: "If the Board can act to
enforce the public's standard of fairness in interpreting contracts,
the Board becomes the monitor of every activity of the association
in its role of proctor for public opinion. This departs entirely from
the congressional concept of acting to preserve the financial integ-
rity of its members."3 0
The court also suggested that cease and desist authority
founded on a violation of law might similarly be restricted to viola-
tions threatening the financial stability of the institution, but the
issue was not resolved as no violations were found." Further, the
court rejected the Bank Board's argument that Gulf Federal's vio-
lation of its loan agreements was inconsistent with the "sound and
economical home-financing" required of federal savings and loan
associations by the Bank Act 2 and concluded that there was no
violation of this provision. The court reasoned that the "sound and
soundness of our insured financial institutions. These new flexible tools relate
strictly to the insurance risk and to assure [sic] the public sound banking
facilities.
Id.
29. 651 F.2d at 264-67.
30. Id. at 264-65.
31. 651 F.2d at 265-66. The court also held that federal law governs only the internal
management of federal savings and loan institutions and does not apply to contractual
agreements between the petitioner and its borrowers which were made under Louisiana law.
Id. at 266. The Supreme Court, citing Gulf Federal, recently criticized the internal/external
distinction as without support in the language of the HOLA or its legislative history. Fidel-
ity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, _U.S_, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3031 n.23 (1982).
The Gulf Federal court found no violation of Louisiana contract law as it determined
that the loan agreements calling for interest calculation according to 365 day tables also
included a statement of the amount of each payment to be made by borrowers calculated
under 360 day tables. The court held that Louisiana law required conflicting contractual
provisions to be construed to effect the probable intent of the contracting parties. 651 F.2d
at 267. The court either did not accept or failed to notice the Bank Board's findings that the
petitioner's agreements stated the proper amount of payment as calculated under 365 day
tables and that the 360 day calculations only appeared in the amortization of the mortgages
on petitioner's books. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 4, at 16. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1957
(West 1977) (ambiguous contracts are construed against the party who drafted the con-
tract). See also Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 S.2d 1232, 1238 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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economical home financing" provision established criteria for
membership in the federal savings and loan system and did not
specify a standard of conduct capable of violation.33 The court did
not specifically address the Board's argument that, as it was ex-
pressly authorized to terminate an association's membership where
the association's policies were inconsistent with "sound and eco-
nomical home financing," it should certainly be deemed to possess
the discretion to rely on an intermediate remedy, the cease and
desist order, to correct these policies where possible.3 4 The court
did, however, conclude that the "sound and economical home
financing" provision was, like the "unsafe and unsound" provision,
addressed to policies that might "lead to future insolvency," not to
policies deemed unfair or usurious by the Bank Board.3 5
II. UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES
Congress has never defined "unsafe and unsound practices,"
yet the formula appears in nearly every enforcement device availa-
ble to the banking agencies. In the event of "unsafe or unsound
practices," the agencies are authorized to issue cease and desist or-
ders 6 remove or suspend officers and directors,3 7 impose civil
sanctions,3 and terminate insurance.3 The existence of the "un-
safe and unsound practices" formula in the statutory authorization
for so many enforcement devices, combined with the discretion
granted the agencies by the courts, has permitted the agencies to
select from a variety of enforcement devices to correct imprudent
practices, enhancing the flexibility and efficiency of the regulatory
scheme.
The Gulf Federal court, however, treated Congress' abstention
from definition of the formula as if it were an oversight, although
the legislative history of the Bank Board's cease and desist author-
ity belies this conclusion. Quoting remarks made during House de-
bate by Congressman Patman, the sponsor of the bill, the court
suggests that Congress believed that the unsafe and unsound prac-
33. 651 F.2d at 265.
34. Respondents Brief, supra note 4, at 19.
35. 651 F.2d at 265-66.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(4)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1986).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i) (1976); 12 U.S.C. § 1730(i) (1976).
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tice formula was exact and clearly restricted to practices posing a
direct threat to an insured institution's financial stability.40 In ad-
dition, the court placed particular reliance on a memorandum on
the meaning of "unsafe and unsound practices" submitted by John
Horne, then Chairman of the Bank Board, and adopted by both
Houses in their records.,1 Chairman' Horne's memorandum sug-
gested an often quoted guideline for identifying "unsafe and un-
sound practices" which holds that "unsafe and unsound practices"
are those which are "contrary to generally accepted standards of
prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if contin-
ued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institu-
tion. .... ,,41 The court asserted that this guideline is the "authori-
tative definition" of "unsafe and unsound practices. '43 In addition,
the court noted several examples of "unsafe and unsound" prac-
tices listed by Chairman Horne, all involving imprudent loans or
other outlay of capital, to support its limitation of the "unsafe and
unsound" formula to practices threatening the financial stability of
the association.44
The court, however, failed to mention a warning issued by
Chairman Horne just prior to the excerpted portions of his memo-
randum. 5 Chairman Horne stated that the concept of "unsafe and
unsound practices" extended to every aspect of a financial institu-
tion's operation and consequently eluded definition. He warned
that any attempt to impose a definition on the formula would work
to exclude practices not encompassed in the definition which may
nevertheless be injurious to the institution in light of the factual
circumstances. 46 The court failed to heed Chairman Horne's advice
40. See supra note 28.
41. 651 F.2d at 264. See also 112 CONG. REc. 24,984 (1966) (House); id. at 26,474 (Sen-
ate). The full text of the portion of Chairman Home's memorandum that was excerpted by
the court is as follows:
Generally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any action, or
lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent op-
eration, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal
risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies ad-
ministering the insurance funds.
Id.
42. Id.
43. 651 F.2d at 264.
44. Id.; 112 CONG. REc. 26,474 (1966).
45. Id.
46. The full text reads:
19821
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although it deemed his memorandum an authoritative indication
of congressional intent.
This imposition of a restriction upon the "unsafe and un-
sound" formula thwarts Congress' deliberate abstention from re-
striction. Moreover, the limitations imposed by the court severely
frustrate the aim of the authors of the bill to provide a flexible,
discretionary enforcement mechanism. In suggesting that the
"Congressional concept" of cease and desist orders was "action to
prevent financial collapse," the court overlooked the frequently
stated understanding of Congressman Patman and other authors
of the bill that the cease and desist power would provide the Board
with an intermediate remedy, to complement the breadth and dis-
cretion of the regulatory power necessary to ensure a system of
sound and economical home financing.47 The express purpose of
the statute was to provide a remedy suitable for less than drastic
situations."" The legislative history demonstrates that the concept
of cease and desist authority was meant to include effective au-
The concept of 'unsafe or unsound practices' is one of general application
which touches upon the entire field of the operations of a financial institution.
For this reason, it would be virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a
single all inclusive or rigid definition the broad spectrum of activities which are
embraced by the term. The formulation of such a definition would probably op-
erate to exclude those practices not set out in the definition, even though they
might be highly injurious to an institution under a given set of facts or circum-
stances or a cheme [sic] developed by unscrupulous operators to avoid the reach
of the law. Contributing to the difficulty of framing a comprehensive definition is
the fact that particular activity not necessarily unsafe or unsound in every in-
stance may be so when considered in the light of all relevant facts.
Id.
47. Id.
48. E.g., during House debate, Congressman Patman stated that the cease and desist
authority.
[is] needed, not for the benefit of the Federal supervisory agencies, but for
the millions of depositers who have their checking accounts and personal savings
in these institutions. Of course, the benefits of improved supervision accrue not
merely to those persons whose accounts are insured, but to everyone who is a
depositer or creditor of these institutions. And, let us not forget the millions of
borrowers who depend on these institutions for their business needs and their
personal needs such as consumer goods and home financing. So, it is not that we
feel that Government officials should have more authority because this bill does
not give them expanded authority since nothing could exceed their present
power to terminate insurance. The cease and desist power and the very limited
officer removal power represent flexible, intermediate supervisory tools to be
used short of the last resort of insurance termination.
Id. at 24,984.
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thority to make viable the goals of the founders of the Bank
Board-to provide a reliable source of credit for homowners.4 e The
broad statutory mandate given the Bank Board, i.e., promoting
"the best practices of local mutual thrift and home financing insti-
tutions," requires attention to every detail of the operation of fed-
eral savings and loan associations.50 The authors of the bill creat-
ing the Bank Board's cease and desist authority intended that
authority to be co-extensive with the statutory duties of the Bank
Board.51 They also believed that the situations calling for exercise
of cease and desist authority could not be defined without refer-
ence to particular circumstances and that such definition was best
entrusted to those in close contact with these circumstances and
familiar with the regulatory scheme.
52
In previous decisions, the Fifth Circuit has noted the intention
of Congress that the banking agencies' cease and desist authority
be of a flexible, discretionary character.5 3 Emphasis has been
placed on the interpretive discretion accorded the regulatory agen-
cies, as in the leading case of Groos National Bank v. Comptroller
of the Currency." The Groos National court rejected the peti-
tioner's argument that the phrase "unsafe and unsound," lacking
definite meaning, could not be used to deprive it of rights, stating:
The phrase 'unsafe or unsound banking practice' is widely used in the
regulatory statutes and in case law, and one of the purposes of the banking
acts is clearly to commit the progressive definition and eradication of such
49. See generally S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong.; 2d Sess. 3537-38, reprinted in 1966
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 3532; 112 CONG. REv. 24,984.
50. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Herman, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964). In Reich, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that the Bank Board did not have the authority
under the HOLA to enforce common law fiduciary duties. The court reasoned:
Construing the statute as a whole and in light of its purpose... it is mani-
fest that Congress envisioned a strong Bank Board with broad regulatory power
to redeem and make viable the initial condition of charter issuance that primary
consideration [be given] to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home
financing institutions in the United States.
336 F.2d at 157-58 (citations omitted).
51. 112 CONG. REC. 24,983-84 (1966).
52. Id. at 26,474 (Home memorandum).
53. See cases discussed infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. The fact that the
prior Fifth Circuit cases were decided by different panels than that which decided the Gulf
Federal case is noteworthy.
54. 573 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978).
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practices to the expertise of the appropriate regulatory agencies.1'
Quoting this language from Groos National, the Fifth Circuit
in First National Bank of Lamarque v. Smith refused to grant de-
claratory judgment for a petitioner who challenged the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency's authority to issue letters identifying the re-
ceipt by bank insiders of commissions from the sale of credit life
insurance as an unsafe and unsound practice.50
The comptroller's interpretive discretion was also emphasized
in Independent Bankers Association of America v. Heimann,
where petitioners sought to enjoin the Office of the Comptroller
from enforcing a regulation prohibiting insiders from benefiting
from the sale of insurance. 57 Upholding the comptroller's author-
ity, the court expressed the traditional judicial attitude towards
the banking agencies' enforcement authority:
National banks are perhaps as meticulously regulated as any industry.
Every aspect of their affairs is scrutinized to assure financial soundness and
ethical practice. The Comptroller's statutory duties require the closest moni-
toring and continuous supervision of these institutions. Thus the Comptrol-
ler's discretionary authority to define and eliminate "unsafe and unsound"
conduct is to be liberally construed.58
The Gulf Federal court ignored the tradition of liberal con-
struction of the banking agencies' authority to characterize "unsafe
and unsound practices" established by these decisions, as well as
the discretion intentionally vested in the agencies by Congress. Ar-
guably these previous decisions upheld action to eliminate threats
to financial stability,5 9 but in Gulf Federal the court made no at-
tempt to distinguish the precedent it ignored. The court did, how-
ever, implicitly acknowledge that within the sphere of activity di-
rectly affecting the financial condition of federal savings and loans,
the Board's authority is discretionary. 0 The court repeatedly sug-
55. Id. at 897.
56. 610 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1980).
57. 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
58. Id. at 1168-69.
59. The petitioner in Groos Nat'l was ordered to cease extending high risk credit to its
controlling shareholder and his relatives and associates. In Independent Bankers Ass'n and
First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque, the comptroller's letter and regulation were aimed at receipt
of commissions by bank insiders from the sale of credit life insurance which may encourage
extension of high risk credit. Thus, all three of these cease and desist orders may fall within
the Gulf Federal court's threat to financial stability test.
60. See 651 F.2d at 264-65. The court further states:
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gested that it accepted the petitioner's argument that the regula-
tory power and responsibility of the Bank Board is confined to
guaranteeing the financial stability of savings and loans and does
not extend to consumer protection."1 Arguably, therefore, the court
did not usurp the Bank Board's discretionary authority to define
"unsafe and unsound practices," but merely confined it to "the
Board's traditional sphere of activity"6 2 (i.e., protecting the gov-
ernment's interest as an insurer).
Even this position, however, ignores clear evidence that Con-
gress expects the Bank Board to play a role in ensuring the con-
sumer and the community of the integrity of federal savings and
loans and, where necessary, to use its cease and desist power to do
so. The Bank Board is charged with responsibility for enforcing
the Truth in Lending Act,63 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,"
Community Reinvestment Act,65 and other consumer and commu-
nity oriented laws as they apply to federal savings and loans6 and
is consequently responsible for including an assessment of an insti-
tution's compliance with those laws in its periodic examinations of
the institution. In many cases the Bank Board is explicitly di-
rected to use its cease and desist power to correct violations of
these statutes.6 8 Thus Congress contemplated that the Bank
Board's regulatory activity in general, and its cease and desist
power in particular, should, when appropriate, encompass con-
sumer protection. Indeed, it would be quite an anomalous situation
if the Bank Board were charged with responsibility for enforcing
these statutes but could not use its only intermediate sanction, the
cease and desist order, to enforce them and was forced to resort to
[W]e hold that the Board may use its cease and desist power when a savings
and loan association commits an "unsafe or unsound practice" or a "violation of
law." The "unsafe or unsound practice" provision, however, refers only to prac-
tices that threaten the financial integrity of the association.
Id. at 267.
61. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
62. 651 F.2d at 262 (petitioner's argument).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
64. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-09 (1976).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
66. These include the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, 91a-91f (1976),
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, 8la-Sit (1976).
67. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2903(1) (1976 & Supp. 1980) (Community Reinvestment Act).
68. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1607(a)(2) (1976) (Truth in Lending Act) and 12 U.S.C. §
2804(b)(2) (1976) (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act).
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termination of insurance or appointment of a receiver."
Recent congressional discussion regarding amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) even further undermines
the court's position that the Bank Board's cease and desist author-
ity is restricted to actions having a direct effect on the financial
stability of insured institutions. The amendments, intended to
eliminate duplicative regulation of savings and loans, exempted
savings and loan associations from the scope of the FTCA on the
grounds that the Bank Board had "the necessary regulatory tools
to protect consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices by
savings and loan associations. 70 The House committee, in fact, in-
cluded a letter from the Chairman of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board discussing the Gulf Federal cease and desist order in
its report on the amendments. The letter states:
The interest of the Bank Board in policing unfair or deceptive trade
practices is indicated by a cease and desist order it issued this past year
which required restitution by an S. & L. to mortgagors of over-payments in
interest, where the particular method used for computing interest (a 360 day
year) was clearly legally permissible and in fact the dominant method used in
the State, but the S. & L.'s form instruments indicated a 365 day schedule."
Congress has thus implicitly endorsed the consumer protection
efforts of the Bank Board as well as the cease and desist order
issued to Gulf Federal. Clearly the intent of Congress and the
traditional position of the courts has been that it is within the au-
thority of the Bank Board to guarantee not only the financial sta-
bility of federal savings and loans but also the integrity of these
institutions as a reliable source of credit for homeowners.
III. JuDIcIAL REvIEw OF AGENCY ACTION
As discussed above, the Gulf Federal decision is disconcerting
in that it fails to acknowledge congressional and judicial interpre-
tation of the Bank Board's enforcement authority. Even broader in
its implications for the future, however, is the fact that the court
ignored voluminous precedent and statutory mandate in refusing
to apply the traditional standards of review of agency action. The
69. H.R. REPORT No. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEws 1462. See also supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Seass. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 372-73.
71. Id. at 376-77.
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court supported its refusal to apply the traditional deferential
standards of review by arguing that the boundaries of the Board's
cease and desist authority were at issue in Gulf Federal and that
definition of these boundaries required judicial and not adminis-
trative expertise. 2
Review of all administrative action has been limited by two
controlling maxims of judicial review: (1) courts will not substitute
their judgment for that of the agency;7 3 and (2) great deference is
given to an administrative agency's interpretation of its enabling
statutes.7 4 These maxims require that courts uphold an interpreta-
tion of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement where
reasonable, even if the interpretation is not the only reasonable
one, or even, in the opinion of the court, the most reasonable. 5
The tradition of deference to an agency's construction of its ena-
bling statutes rests on respect for the expertise of administrative
agencies in often highly technical fields and recognition of congres-
sional intent to entrust the task of uniform statutory enforcement
to the agencies. 8
In many cases, the complexity of financial institution regula-
tion has promoted especially strict adherence to the principle of
deference to an agency's expertise.7 7 Neither the courts nor Con-
72. 651 F.2d at 263.
73. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980); Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d
971, 976 (5th Cir. 1974).
74. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 450 (1946); Till v. Unifirst
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 1981); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet,
Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1974).
75. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329
U.S. 143 (1946); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 (1930). See also Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418 (5th
Cir. 1972).
76. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1980); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965); Consolo v. Fed. & Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See also Till v. Unifirst Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Consolo).
77. The Fifth Circuit, in Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1974), articulated the reasons for deference to agency intepretation when it upheld the Fed-
eral Reserve's interpretation of a regulation, promulgated under the Truth in Lending Act,
stating that the Federal Reserve Board's interpretations "are entitled to great weight, for
they constitute part of the body of informed experience and judgment of the agency to
whom Congress delegated appropriate authority." Id. at 976. Notably the Fifth Circuit also
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gress are capable of staying abreast of the multitude of factors that
work to keep the banking system running smoothly.7" Mr. Justice
Rutledge expressed this view eloquently in his concurring opinion
in Federal Research System v. Agnew, where the Supreme Court
upheld the Federal Reserve's removal of national bank directors
for violation of the Banking Act.7 9 Regarding the Federal Reserve
Board of Governor's, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated:
Not only because Congress has committed the system's operation to their
hands, but also because the system itself is a highly specialized and technical
one, requiring expert and coordinated management in all its phases, I think
their judgment should be conclusive upon any matter which, like this one, is
open to reasonable difference of opinion. Their specialized experience gives
them an advantage judges cannot possibly have, not only in dealing with the
problems raised for their discretion by the system's working, but also in as-
certaining the meaning Congress had in mind in prescribing the standards by
which they should administer it2°
The Gulf Federal court, however, determined that judicial ex-
pertise was better suited to interpreting the meaning of "unsafe
and unsound practices" and "policy . . .inconsistent with sound
and economical home financing" than was the expertise of the
Bank Board. The distinction noted above upon which the court
apparently8l rests this determination (i.e., that between judicial
determination of the statutory boundaries of agency authority and
ordinary review of an agency's decisions) is ill-founded on two
grounds. First, the tradition of deference to agencies' views has
been followed in review of all types of administrative action, and
often precisely where that agency action has been challenged, as in
Gulf Federal, on the grounds that it exceeds the statutory author-
expressed this view, subsequent to its decision in Gulf Federal, in Till v. Unifirst Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1981), where it stated: "[I]n matters of statutory inter-
pretation, courts should be attentive to the views of the administrative entity appointed to
apply and enforce a statute." Id. at 160. The Unifirst Federal panel was composed of differ-
ent judges than the Gulf Federal panel. See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444
U.S. 555, 559 (1980); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); First
Bank of La Marque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980); Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. See Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 568-69; Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441, 449-50 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Cf. Bright v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
616 F.2d 328, 333 n.1 (7th Cir. 1980) (banking is a very complex field),
79. 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
80. Id. at 450.
81. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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ity of the agency.82 Considerations of agency expertise are every bit
as viable when the question is whether governmental interference
is necessary to maintain the statutory scheme as they are when the
question is factual."3 This is particularly true of banking agency
decisions, as the concept of sound banking cannot be applied in
the abstract. Determination of when interference is necessary re-
quires knowledge of the condition of individual banks, the commu-
nities they serve, the people they employ, and various other fac-
tors, as well as familiarity with the workings of the technically
complex system of regulations governing the banking system and
the type of activity that, although not specifically proscribed, could
work to undermine the regulatory structure."
The second difficulty with the court's distinction between de-
termining the bounds of agency authority and general review of
agency action is that the distinction between the bounds of statu-
tory authority and the areas of decisionmaking committed to
agency expertise is not valid in regard to the Bank Board's cease
and desist authority. Because "unsafe and unsound practices" and
"violation of law" are not defined in the statute, each exercise of
cease and desist authority will necessarily identify a particular ac-
tivity as an "unsafe or unsound practice" or a "violation of law.""5
The Bank Board defines the bounds of its cease and desist author-
ity by its determination that some particular activity jeopardizes
the safety or soundness of the institution or institutions involved,
or violates some aspect of the regulatory scheme or law. Recogni-
tion of the fact that rulemaking is contemporaneous with enforce-
ment of the statutory mandate of the banking agencies is at the
core of the courts' traditionally exceptional deference to their
decisions.8 6
82. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. 555, Mourning v. Family Publications
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); AT&T v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936); Kaneb Servs.,
Inc. v. FSLIC, 650 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1981); Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613 F.2d
1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964); Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Hykel, 333 F.
Supp. 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1971). But cf. Retailers Corp. of Arizona v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F.
Supp. 308, 313-14 (D. Ariz. 1976) (the judiciary has the duty to determine the bounds of
statutory authority).
83. See generally cases cited supra note 82.
84. See generally Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 559-60; Agnew, 329 U.S. at 450
(Rutledge, J., concurring); Reich, 336 F.2d at 158. See also 112 CONG. REc. 26,474 (1966).
85. See Independent Bankers Ass'n, 613 F.2d at 1168-69.
86. See Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978);
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The Gulf Federal decision, however, failed to recognize that
the enforcement power of the banking agencies is necessarily dis-
cretionary. The court would limit the Bank Board's cease and de-
sist power to practices which directly threaten the government's
insurance interest and, more importantly, would appropriate for
the courts the power to identify practices which threaten this in-
terest. The court not only rejected the agency's interpretation of
its enabling statute, but rejected the Bank Board's determination
that Gulf Federal's violation of its loan contracts fell within the
court's interpretation of the statute. Furthermore, the court re-
jected this primarily factual determination without reference to
any standard of review traditionally applied to agency
determinations.
In addition to the respect due an agency's interpretation of its
enabling statutes under the maxims discussed above, supplemen-
tary guidelines for judicial review of administrative action are codi-
fied in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which delineates
different levels of review varying with the nature of the activity
challenged.7 Review of cease and desist orders and other agency
action based on adjudicatory or fact-finding proceedings is limited
by the APA to determination that the action or decision is or is not
supported by substantial evidence.88 The Supreme Court gave the
authoritative definition of "substantial evidence" in Consolo v.
Federal Maritime Commission.9 Holding that "substantial evi-
dence" is such evidence as a reasonable mind would find satisfac-
tory to support the conclusion, 0 the Court stated: "This is some-
thing less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964).
87. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973)
(appropriate standard of review of Comptroller of Currency's denial of application for au-
thority to organize bank is not "substantial evidence" test, but the arbitrary and capricious
standard provided in Administrative Procedure Act); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-15 (1971) (Administrative Procedure Act determines stan-
dard of review).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). See also Camp, 411 U.S. at 141 (1973); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 414-15 (1971); Groos Nat'l Bank, 573 F.2d at 896-
97.
89. 383 U.S. 607, 619-21 (1965). Senator Robertson mentioned this definition with re-
gard to the cease and desist authority of the financial regulatory agencies in his presentation
of the Senate Conference Report on the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966. 112
CONG. REC. 27,473 (1966).
90. 383 U.S. at 620, quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
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drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported
by substantial evidence." '
The original Senate bill creating the cease and desist authority
of the financial regulatory agencies stipulated that cease and desist
orders should be reviewed under the stricter "weight of the evi-
dence" rule rather than the "substantial evidence" rule which
would apply absent a provision to the contrary.9 2 This stipulation
was made in response to fears expressed by members of the bank-
ing industry that the statute would subject them to the arbitrary
dictates of bureaucrats which would not be adequately reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard. 3 The House, however,
deleted the weight of the evidence rule from the bill and, after con-
ference, the Senate conferees reported to the full Senate that the
industry's fears were unfounded.9
Congress thus expressly mandated that the banking agencies'
cease and desist authority be reviewed under the substantial evi-
dence standard. This standard is especially appropriate to the type
of flexible enforcement tool Congress envisioned when it created
the cease and desist authority. It reduces the incentive for dilatory
litigation and the potential for judicial imposition of criteria for
exercise of administrative authority.95 The Supreme Court summa-
rized these advantages in Consolo stating:
Congress was very deliberate in adopting this standard of review. It frees
the reviewing courts of the time consuming and difficult task of weighing the
evidence, it gives proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tribu-
nal and it helps promote the uniform application of the statute... [A]gency
determinations frequently rest upon a complex and hard-to-review mix of
considerations.... [Clongress places a premium upon agency expertise, and,
for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to mimimize the opportunity
for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency."
In Gulf Federal, review under the substantial evidence test
would have required the court to set aside the Bank Board's cease
91. 383 U.S. at 620.
92. 112 CONG. Rxc. 26,473 (1966). The "weight of the evidence" rule holds that the
agency's fact findings must be supported "by the preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence." See G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286, 288 (7th Cir. 1958).
93. 112 CONG. REc. 26, 473 (1966).
94. Id.
95. See infra text accompanying note 96.
96. 383 U.S. at 620-21.
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and desist order only if it could not reasonably be concluded from
the factual findings of the Board that petitioner's deviation from
the provision of its loan agreements was an "unsafe or unsound"
practice or inconsistent with "sound and economical home financ-
ing." Even if the court were correct in interpreting the statute as
granting authority only to prevent practices which threaten the in-
tegrity of federal savings and loans, it ought not to have set aside
the cease and desist order unless the Bank Board's conclusion that
Gulf Federal's financial integrity was threatened by potential lia-
bility stemming from the overcharging practice was insupportable.
This approach was followed by the Fifth Circuit three years earlier
in Groos National Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency where, af-
firming a cease and desist order issued by the Comptroller of the
Currency, it held that there was substantial evidence to support
the comptroller's finding that the petitioning bank's extension of
high risk credit to its controlling shareholder and his family was an
"unsafe and unsound" banking practice.9 7
The Gulf Federal court, however, makes no reference to the
"substantial evidence" standard ignoring statutory and preceden-
tial authority. These standards of review are based on sound policy
considerations. Deference to the Bank Board's expertise may, in a
particular case, yield distasteful results, but as a principle of judi-
cial review it relieves the courts of having to familiarize themselves
with the many considerations which may enter into regulatory de-
cisions in this highly technical field and permits uniform regulation
by the experts to whom Congress has assigned the task.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GULF FEDERAL
Under any circumstances the Gulf Federal court's cavalier at-
titude toward the Bank Board's authority would be disturbing.
The current precarious condition of the savings and loan industry
renders the court's decision doubly imprudent. While the Bank
Board, the FDIC, and several congressmen are struggling to rescue
the industry from bankruptcy, the Gulf Federal court has moved
to weaken the authority of the Bank Board in a decision which
implicitly endorses what is at least an unethical practice.
The immediate effect of the Gulf Federal decision is to
weaken the congressionally contemplated and judicially affirmed
97. 573 F.2d at 897.
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scheme of Bank Board supervision of the most detailed aspects of
savings and loan operation. The long term effects of the Gulf Fed-
eral decision are as yet unclear. The decision may drastically alter
the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial institution regula-
tory structure if it is perceived as an indication that the courts
have decided to facilitate deregulation of the financial industry on
their own. The tacit recognition within the industry that the bank-
ing agencies prevail in court has induced quick and uncoerced
compliance with agency recommendations in the past. If the Gulf
Federal decision is accepted, regulated institutions may seek to
challenge the agencies' discretion in court on a regular basis. The
damage that may result from costly and dilatory litigation over
agency action is unpredictable. However, it is doubtful that the
troubled savings and loan industry will wait for legislative deregu-
lation to test the legitimacy of previously unconsidered practices if
Gulf Federal is perceived as a shift in judicial attitude towards
banking agency discretion. As a consequence, the over-extended re-
sources of both the federal government and the savings and loan
industry may be further depleted and the current efforts of the
Bank Board and the FDIC to solve the industry's problems may be
impeded and delayed.
CONCLUSION
The Gulf Federal decision is an ill-timed departure from
traditional judicial recognition of congressional intent that the
banking agencies have great discretion in applying and selecting
their enforcement techniques. The decision implicitly draws deter-
minations traditionally made by banking experts into the sluggish
and expensive federal court system at a time when the savings and
loan industry's resources are running out. Furthermore, the Gulf
Federal court violated cardinal principles of judicial review of
agency action by substituting its discretion and interpretation of
agency authority for that of the agency in question. These princi-
ples have evolved over years of judicial consideration of agency ac-
tion and congressional intent. The court's disregard of the tradi-
tional principles of judicial review at such an inappropriate
moment is likely to produce the results that they were intended to
prevent by opening the door to judicial rather than administrative
or congressional supervision of financial institutions.
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